

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

*Memo
Chung*

ID.	ACRON	REQ	DATE	INITIAL
1	NO	✓	12/6/83	
2	NO	✓	12/6/83	
3	NO			
4	NO			
5	NO			
6	NO			
7	NO			
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9	NO			
10	NO			
11	NO			
12	NO			
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14	NO			
15	NO			
16	NO			
17	NO			
18	NO			
19	NO			
20	NO/GPF via C/NE			
21				
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SUPPLEMENT 18 DEC 1983

Remarks

12/6/83

Date

ER 83-4892/1

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

6 December 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: NIO/General Purpose Forces

FROM: DCI

Ted:

What do you make of this study on
Future Soviet Weapons Assessment.

It's not what I had in mind when I
told you I wanted to talk about Soviet
weapons in development in my Worldwide
briefing. I want much more concrete and
specific indications of what we may have
to face.



William J. Casey

Attachment:
DDI-8565/83



S E C R E T

DDI- 8565/83

29 NOV
1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Future Soviet Weapons Assessment

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1. On 7 October you requested OSWR, in concert with SOVA, to conduct a future weapons assessment of the overall military threat, by mission area, that the Soviets are likely to pose during the 1990s. I am including with this memorandum the results of that assessment, presented as a series of charts, graphs, and tables with a summary page showing the major conclusions of the study. Since your request was prompted by the need for a U.S. balance between expenditures for a possible U.S. manned space station and the coverage of major future Soviet threats, we have tried to portray the threat posed by the Soviet space program in the mid-1990s, together with other Soviet threats. The results of our study are presented as separate stand-alone charts, each with an accompanying description.

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2. OSWR assessed about 45 Soviet weapons systems, attributing to each a threat index based on the technical improvements and the deployment expected in 1995, together with the breadth of application expected for each weapon. This assessment, together with SOVA estimates of future Soviet force levels, current R&D efforts and our estimates of the Soviet defense spending patterns has one principal bottom line: The projections of Soviet forces show increments to force capabilities in all mission areas and we expect that the pattern of across-the-board force development will continue during the next 10-15 years. To a good approximation, the 1995 threat posed by weapons in each major Soviet mission area will be proportional to what it is today, but study suggests that the Soviets will roughly double their overall weapon effectiveness by 1995 - a threat improvement that could be offset by U.S. and allied weapons developments.

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Robert M. Gates

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Attachments: As Stated

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S E C R E T

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Conclusions of the Study

1. Estimates of Soviet weapons improvements, force levels, R and D efforts and spending patterns all indicate that force capabilities in 1995 will be larger, but will have approximately the same mission area distribution as today.



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2. A study of 45 Soviet weapons initiatives suggests that the Soviets will roughly double their overall weapon effectiveness by 1995 - a threat improvement that could be offset by U.S. and allied weapons improvements.



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3. The major increases in threat will come from improvements in cruise missiles, lasers and warheads; in more conventional weapons such as helicopters, tanks, and artillery; and in major support systems such as AWACS, communications and navigational satellites and electronic warfare. Intelligence analysis will have to be devoted to these changing types of weapons as well as to those that will continue to pose high absolute threats (e.g., ICBMs, IRBMs, ABMs, etc.) or those where the significance of breakout would be exceptionally important (e.g., ASW developments.)



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4. The most marked Soviet weapons improvements will be associated with ground-initiated and ground-targeted weaponry, followed in order by air, sea and space weapons improvements.



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5. The prospect of Soviet space systems carrying out direct attacks on ground, sea or air assets before 1995 is negligible. However, satellites will become more effective in supporting attacks by other Soviet assets.



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6. A permanently manned Soviet space station poses no more threat than the average Soviet weapon system under development. It will have fairly broad applicability in a support role, but it will also be vulnerable to attack.




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Comparative Soviet Threat (1985-1995)

In the accompanying figure the left-hand charts show our estimates of the Soviet threat distribution in 1985 for carrying out Soviet world-wide obligations (top) and for threatening the U.S. ability to deter (bottom). Each of the left-hand charts for 1985 is divided into four sections that portray these two overall missions by sub-category. 

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After assigning each of the Soviet weapons systems now in development to its appropriate sub-category, we undertook an analysis to determine the improvement in each weapons system from 1985 to 1995, based on estimates of (1) the change in the numbers of weapons that will be deployed; (2) the technical improvement in each weapon; and (3) the breadth of applicability of each weapon. We judge that the typical weapon threat improvement of the weapons we identified under each sub-category is representative of all weapons under development in that sub-category; hence, we can portray the relative emphasis that the Soviets are giving to improving their weapons in each sub-category between 1985 and 1995, shown in the middle two charts. Note that the threat increment posed by the typical weapon set in each subcategory is approximately equal, resulting in our expectation that the Soviets will produce a 1995 threat for each overall mission which is approximately proportional to the 1985 threat. The magnitude of the 1995 threat is about twice the 1985 threat in both overall mission areas, as shown by the larger areas of each of the two right-hand 1995 threat charts. This threat improvement will be diminished in proportion to the U.S. and allied response to the threat. 


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Differences of less than about 5% between the percentages of identical sub-categories shown on the left and right hand charts are probably not significant.

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The 1995 threat and the projected 1985-1995 threat improvement for each weapon is given, by mission subcategory, in the accompanying tables: one for worldwide conventional warfare and one for strategic nuclear warfare. The distribution of these weapons threat improvements generates the two middle charts of the figure. 

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